Introduction
Spinoza identifies the minds or souls of finite things with God's ideas of those things.
Margaret Wilson famously suggests that this identification prevents Spinoza from giving an adequate account of the human mind:
Descartes's position on the mind-body issue is notoriously beset with difficulties.
Still, [his] theory of res cogitantes does recognize and take account of certain propositions about the mental that seem either self-evidently true or fundamental to the whole concept. These include … that the mind (in a straightforward and common sense of the terms) represents or has knowledge of external bodies; that it is ignorant of much that happens in "its" body; that having a mind is associated with thinking and being conscious; that mentality is recognizable from behavior of a certain sort, and the absence of mentality from "behavior" of other sorts. Will not Spinoza's theory of "minds" simply fail to be a theory of the mental if it carries the denial of all or most of these propositions? More specifically, will it not fail to make sense of the specific phenomena of human mentality by attempting to construe the human mind as just a circumscribed piece of God's omniscience? (Wilson 1980: 111) This is the primary question that I will try to address: Can Spinoza "recognize and take account of" such "specific phenomena of human mentality" as (i) ignorance of many internal bodily states, (ii) representation of the external world, (iii) consciousness, and (iv) expression in behavior? In order to answer this question, we must solve four puzzles about his theory of the imagination, each corresponding to one of the four phenomena of our primary question. In order to solve these puzzles, in turn, we must first understand some of Spinoza's central doctrines concerning a number of closely related topics-and we must understand an aspect of Spinoza's approach to philosophy that I will call his incremental naturalism. Doing so will -2-allow us to see a good deal of his philosophy in a clearer and potentially more attractive light-or at least, so I imagine.
Four Puzzles about the Imagination
Imagination Defined. Spinoza defines 'imagination' in Ethics 2p17s:
[T]he affections of the human Body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we shall call images of things, even if they do not reproduce the figures of things. And when the Mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines.
As this indicates, his use of the term 'imagination' is broad enough to include sensation as well as mental imagery and to include modalities of bodily representation that do not represent shape. He goes on to identify imagination as the first and lowest of the three kinds of knowledge or cognition [cognitio] , with the intellect (constituted by distinct and adequate ideas) providing the higher (second and third) kinds of knowledge. It is clear that we perceive many things and form universal notions: I. from singular things which have been represented to us through the senses in a way that is mutilated, confused, and without order for the intellect (see P29C); for that reason I have been accustomed to call such perceptions knowledge from random experience; II. from signs, e.g., from the fact that, having heard or read certain words, we recollect things, and form certain ideas of them, which are like them, and through which we imagine the things (P18S). These two ways of regarding things I shall henceforth call knowledge of the first kind, opinion or imagination.III. Finally, [we have cognition] from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (see P38C, P39, P39C, and P40). This I shall call reason and the second kind of knowledge.
[IV.] In addition to these two kinds of knowledge, there is (as I shall show in what follows) another, third kind, which we shall call intuitive knowledge [scientia intuitiva] . And this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. Ethics 2p17s treats imagination as the having of a certain kind of idea, while 2p40s2 characterizes it as a way of perceiving or having knowledge [cognitio] ; but this does not mark any distinction between senses of imagination, since all ideation is perception or knowledge, and vice versa, for Spinoza. See, for example, his use of 1a4 (which concerns "knowledge") in 1p25d. See also his comment about "perception" and "conception" in 2d3, and his very similar account of "four kinds of perception" in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect § §18-29.
its seemingly unlimited scope. Prior to his initial definition of imagination, Spinoza asserts in 2p12 that whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human Mind must be perceived by the human Mind, or there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in the Mind; i.e., if the object of the idea constituting a human Mind is a body, [then] nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the Mind.
In the next proposition, he goes on to specify that "the object of the idea constituting the human mind" indeed is the human body-with the obvious consequence that nothing can happen in the human body that is not perceived by the human mind. 2 Furthermore, it is clear that this "perception of whatever happens in the human body" must be imagination, rather than intellection. 3 Hence, it seems that, for Spinoza, a human being's mind perceives by way of imagination everything that happens in his or her body-including, to borrow Michael Della Rocca's example (1996: 9) , each specific chemical reaction in the pancreas.
This result is surprising enough. But it seems that we have not yet reached the limits of imagination. For in the immediately following scholium, Spinoza remarks:
The things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain more to man than to other Individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are animate. For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause in the same way as he is of the idea of the human Body. And so, whatever we have said of the idea of the human Body must also be said of the idea of any thing. (2p13s) 2 2p13: "The object of the idea constituting the human Mind is the Body, or a certain mode of Extension that actually exists, and nothing else." 3 Spinoza regularly treats his distinction of three kinds of knowledge or cognition as jointly exhaustive of all perception. Yet he holds that the human mind's perception of what occurs in the human body is both inadequate and confused. (According to 2p19, "the human Mind does not know the human Body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through ideas of affections by which the Body is affected"; and according to 3p27, "the idea of any affection of the human Body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself." Furthermore, according to 3p28, "the ideas of the affections of the human Body, insofar as they are related only to the human Mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.") And of the three kinds of knowledge, only the first kind, imagination, can be either inadequate or confused (2p28s, 2p41d, 5p28d).
Thus, every "individual" or "thing" has an idea that is related to that individual in just the way that the human mind is related to the human body; and, at least once (3p1d), he uses the term 'minds' to designate these ideas of non-human things." 4 It appears, then, that even individual things whose behavior may seem to express no sentience at all will nevertheless have "minds" and perceive by imagination whatever happens in their "bodies": it seems, for example, that toasters must perceive the flow of electricity to their heating elements. Hence, the first puzzle:
How can Spinoza seriously maintain that the phenomenon of imagination is so pervasive as to include perception, by every individual thing, of "whatever happens in" its body?
A 5 These claims include the following: that "men believe themselves free because they are conscious of their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined" (3p2s; see also Appendix to Part 1 and 2p35s); that "the Mind … strives, for an indefinite duration, to persevere in its being and it is conscious of this striving it has" (3p9); that "desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetites [so that] desire can be defined as appetite together with consciousness of the appetite" (3p9s); that "man is conscious of himself through the affections by which he is determined to act" (3p30d); and that "knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an affect of Joy or Sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it" (4p8; see also 4p19d and 4p64d). 6 In Part 3, Spinoza writes of animals such as horses as having "lusts" (3p57s); and a "lust" is defined as a kind of "love and desire" (3p56s, Definition of the Affects 48). From this it seems to follow (by 3p9s) that a lust consists partly in an "appetite together with consciousness of the appetite," and hence that horses, at least, are also conscious to some extent. 7 Wilson devotes particular attention to the argument of 3p9d that human beings are conscious of the Mind's striving to persevere in its being. The core of this demonstration is the citation of 2p23 to show that human beings are conscious of the ideas of the affections of their bodies. But 2p23 does not use the term 'conscious' at all; rather, it claims that human beings have ideas of the ideas of the affections of the body, and the argument for this claim, in turn, depends on noting that God must have an idea of each of his affections including the human Still, when he reaches Part 5 of the Ethics, Spinoza does clearly imply that there are at least degrees of consciousness. In 5p31s, he writes, "The more each of us is able to achieve in this [third] kind of knowledge, the more he is conscious of himself and of God, i.e., the more perfect and blessed he is" (see also 5p42s). In 5p39s, he explains further:
[H]e who, like an infant or a child, has a Body capable of very few things, and very heavily dependent on external causes, has a Mind which considered solely in itself is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things. On the other hand, he who has a Body capable of a great many things, has a Mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and of God, and of things.
In this life, therefore, we strive especially that the infant's Body may change (as much as its nature allows and assists) into another, capable of a great many things and related to a Mind very much conscious of itself, of God, and of things. We strive, that is, that whatever is related to its memory or imagination is of hardly any moment in relation to the intellect.
These passages suggest that differences in degrees of consciousness are grounded in differences of bodily capacity and/or intellectual knowledge.
Yet upon examination, this suggestion does not seem to offer a promising approach to distinguishing degrees of consciousness in the imagination. The appeal to mere bodily capacities or skills of the sort that infants lack seems of doubtful relevance to degrees of consciousness of any kind. And the appeal to differences of intellect-such as greater achievements of "the third kind of knowledge"-seems no more helpful, for two reasons.
First, it is not obvious why differences of intellect should have any bearing on differences in the consciousness of imagination. Second, as Wilson argues, it seems doubtful whether Spinoza's own account of the intellect provides any basis for distinguishing different minds with respect to the contents of their intellects. For according to that account (2pp37-46), the mind, and an idea of any mind must be united to that mind in the same way-i.e., by identity-that a mind is united to the body that is its object. Her special attention to this argument is the result, in part, of the identification of consciousness with having ideas of ideas in Curley 1969 (see also Curley 1988:71-72) .
foundation for knowledge of the higher, intellectual kinds lies in certain "common notions"
that must be perceived adequately in any act of perception performed by any mind. 
Some Central Doctrines and the Approach of Incremental Naturalism
To resolve these puzzles, it is essential to understand some of Spinoza's central doctrines concerning such topics as inherence, individuality, conatus, power of thinking, minds, confusion, and intellection. I will take up these topics in that order.
Inherence. Perhaps the most fundamental relation in Spinoza's metaphysics is the relation of "being in." Spinoza introduces the relation at the very outset of the Ethics, in 1d3 and 1d5, when he defines 'substance' as "what is in itself and is conceived through itself" and 'modes'
as "the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived." 9 I will use the term 'inherence' to designate this relation of being "in" and to distinguish it from the 'in' of spatial containment and from the 'in' of the relation of parts to wholes .10
Although the definition of 'mode' indicates that the affections or modes of a substance are in that substance, it is not only substances that can have modes or affections in them. In the scholium to the proposition, he also affirms the 
Conatus as Power Doctrine:
The power of each singular thing is (i.e., consists entirely in) its conatus, which is its striving to persevere in its being.
The doctrine that every singular thing has some power to persevere in its being may seem surprising; but consider the central case of finite individuals. It is the nature of an individual to communicate motion among its parts in a fixed manner or pattern. But a communication of motion among elements that does not tend to persist cannot be a fixed manner or pattern; and whatever does tend to persist or repeat itself as such a pattern has a nature that serves to explain, at least in part, its persistence under particular circumstances. Take, for example the simple case of a rock or a toaster. If force is successfully exerted to move one part of a rock or a toaster, the rest of the rock or toaster will tend to move as well, maintaining contact with the 14 3p7: "This striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing." part on which force was originally exerted in such a way that the rock or toaster remains able to continue communicating motion among its parts in its distinctive fashion. Some individual bodies, however, have far more resources than a rock or toaster for maintaining the distinctive patterns of communication of motion that constitute their continued existence. Specifically, some individual bodies have systems that register small differences in their environments and utilize the registration of those differences in pursuing bodies and circumstances that will be beneficial to their own preservation while avoiding bodies and circumstances that will be detrimental to it. In other words, they have relatively well-developed sensory systems that are well-integrated into their self-preservatory activities. Rudimentary self-preservers such as rocks and toasters undergo very little if any increase or decrease in their power to preserve themselves. But bodies with well-developed sensory systems can undergo far more variation in their degree of fitness to preserve themselves-depending on the operational fitness of those sensory systems and of the informationef-processing and motor systems with which those systems interact.
Spinoza also identifies a thing's power with its perfection. For example, he defines joy as "a passion by which the Mind passes to a greater perfection" (3p11s), but he characterizes it equally as one by which "the power of the Mind … is increased" (3p15c, citing the previous definition as support); and in the same passages he defines 'sadness' in terms of passage to lesser perfection, while characterizing it equally in terms of decrease in power. 15 And in 2d6, he writes, "By reality and perfection I understand the same thing." Hence he is committed to the following:
Power as Perfection Doctrine: The degree of a singular thing's power is the degree of its perfection, which is also the degree of its reality. (a passage already quoted in part) that all individuals are animate "though in different degrees," he goes on to explain these differences precisely in terms of differences of reality and power:
However, we also cannot deny that ideas differ among themselves, as the objects themselves do, and that one is more excellent than the other, and contains more reality, just as the object of the one is more excellent than the object of the other, and contains more reality. And so to determine what is the difference between the human Mind and the others, and how it surpasses them, it is necessary for us, as
we have said, to know the nature of its object, i.e., of the human Body .… I say this in general, that in proportion as a Body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, and being acted on in many ways at once, its Mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once. And in proportion as the actions of a body depend more on itself alone, and as other bodies concur with it less in acting, so its mind is more capable of understanding distinctly. And from these [truths] we can know the excellence of one mind over the others …. Power of Thinking. Despite the Mode Identity Doctrine, God's attributes, such as thought and extension, are causally independent of one another according to Spinoza-that is, any effect produced in a given attribute must be produced through a cause belonging to that attribute (2p6). It is a mistake, on Spinoza's view, to suppose that an act of thought causes a bodily motion as such, or vice versa; as a mode of extension, a given mode can only cause another mode of extension, while the idea of the first mode, as a mode of thought, causes the -13-idea of the second mode. Just as God exists through multiple attributes constituting his essence, which is also his power (1p34), so too a singular thing is a mode of multiple attributes through which are conceived that singular thing's actual essence-i.e., its conatus (3p7)-which is also its power. Since all power is God's power, the power of a singular thing is an expression or share of God's power. Spinoza calls God's power as expressed and conceived under the attribute of thought "power of thinking" [cogitandi potentia] (2p1s, 2p7c, 2p21s); and, not surprisingly, he also uses this term very frequently to describe the power of each singular thing as that power is expressed and conceived in the attribute of thought (2p49s, 3p2s, 3p11, 3p12d, 3p15d, and 3p28d). This power of thinking is the power by which ideas produce other ideas-ideas that follow from them. Thus, Spinoza holds the
Power of Thinking Doctrine:
The power of a singular thing, as it is expressed under the attribute of thought, is its power of thinking.
From this plus the Conatus as Power Doctrine and the Power as Perfection Doctrine, it
follows that a singular thing's power of thinking is simply its conatus and perfection (and reality) insofar as these are conceived under the attribute of thought. By the Variability of Power Doctrine, it follows that different minds can have different degrees of power of thinking, and the same mind can have different degrees of power of thinking at different times. This is so even though all of these minds of singular things are themselves ideas in God. Thus, some of God's ideas have more power of thinking than do others, and they can increase or decrease in their power of thinking. The same is true of particular ideas in human and other finite minds. 16 The more power an idea has to determine how the singular thing whose idea it is does or does not exercise its power or conatus at a given time, the greater will be the power of thinking of that idea in that particular mind at that particular time-for it is only or chiefly through contributing to the determination of the strength and direction of an individual's conatus that an idea can exert power in that individual. Thus, Spinoza is committed to the Variable Power of Ideas Doctrine: Particular ideas in the mind of a singular thing may have more or less power of thinking than other ideas in the same mind, and they may increase or decrease in power of thinking at different times, depending at least in part on the idea's power for determining how the singular thing strives for self-preservation.
As Spinoza indicates in 4p5, the power of thinking possessed by an externally caused idea in a particular mind is partly a result of the mind's own power and partly a result of the power of that idea's external cause.
Minds. Human and non-human minds have ideas that are "in" them; and yet everything is "in" God. Hence, it follows that some ideas are in human minds and in God; and Spinoza confirms this by writing of the same ideas "as they are in the human mind" and "as they are in
God." As Della Rocca (1996) has argued convincingly, the truth, adequacy, and representational content of an idea can be partly determined for Spinoza by what other ideas are in the same mind with it, so that the same idea can be true and adequate in God while being at the same time false and inadequate in a human mind, distinctly representing its object in God while confusedly representing many things in a human mind. Furthermore, because the common notions are ideas of things present everywhere and equally in the part and in the whole, these ideas must, on Spinoza's account, literally exist in many different minds at the same time. In addition, because the human body is composed of bodies that are its parts, the human mind is, by the Parallelism Doctrine (2p7) and the Mode Identity Doctrine (2p7s), composed of the ideas of those parts, as Spinoza affirms in 2p15; 17 and since individuals can have parts within parts, it follows that the same idea can be a part of more than one mind.
There is no reason why an idea need have exactly the same degree of power in relation to each of the minds or thinkers that it is in, or of which it is a part. On the contrary, since the minds that have the common notions evidently include the minds of philosophers and the minds of their toasters, it seems impossible to deny that the common notions themselves will occur with different power of thinking relative to different minds. Thus, it seems that Spinoza must accept the
Differential Power of Thinking Doctrine:
The same idea may have greater or less power of thinking as it exists in, or as part of, different thinkers or minds.
Confusion. In Cartesian psychology, the confusion or confusedness of ideas is to be contrasted with their distinctness, and Spinoza follows this usage (2p28, 2p28s, 2p29, 2p36, 3p9, 3p58d, 4p1s, 4p59, 5p3d) . Confusion, he holds, is a "privation of knowledge" (2p35) that prevents the mind from distinguishing things that are different (1p8d, 2p41s1). He regards all ideas of imagination as at least somewhat confused (2p40s2), but he does recognize degrees of confusion and distinctness in the imagination (2p40s1, 3p53,d, 3p55d, 4d6, 5p6d), and he characterizes relative distinctness of imagination as allowing what is imagined to be distinguished from other things (see especially 2p40s1, 3p55d, and 4d6).
As we have seen, Spinoza asserts (in 2p16d) that "the idea of any mode in which the human Body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human Body and at the same time the nature of the external body." His grounds are that the conception of an effect always (by 1a4) involves the nature of the cause. Della Rocca (1996: 57-64) has inferred that every idea of imagination is confused, for Spinoza, at least in part because it represents both an internal state of the body and the external cause of that state in such a way that the mind cannot distinguish between them. Even if this is correct, however, inability to distinguish between the internal state and an external cause is not the only aspect of confusion present in imagination. For one thing, Spinoza holds that an idea of imagination owes part of its nature to the nature of the human body itself and part of its nature to the nature of the parts of the human body (2p28d), as well as owing part of its nature to external causes, even though the idea often does not allow the mind to distinguish these contributions. Furthermore, an idea -16-of imagination does not represent any of the finite causes of its corresponding bodily state adequately, but rather in a way that only reflects that cause's ability to produce the particular state of the body in question. Yet a given state of the body can ordinarily be produced by things that otherwise differ in many respects; for example, the same bruise could be produced by a rock or a toaster, and the same state of the auditory processing areas of the brain could be produced by a live voice or a recording. Thus, an idea of imagination can also be confused because it does not itself allow the mind to distinguish among any of the various alternatives that could equally have produced the same effect. Since greater degrees of distinctness involve greater ability to distinguish that which is actually perceived from other things, degrees of confusion will be correlated with the variety of alternative causes among which the mind cannot distinguish. Hence, Spinoza accepts the Causal Confusion Doctrine: An idea is confused in a mind to the extent that it represents its object's causes in a way that does not allow them to be distinguished from one another or from other possible causes.
This helps to explain why an idea's distinctness or confusion can vary depending on the mind or thinker that it is in-for example, being confused in a human mind and yet distinct in God-for the presence of other ideas in the same mind may allow the making of distinctions that could not otherwise be made.
Intellection. Although persistence through time or duration is one kind of persevering in being, it is not the only kind, nor even the most important kind. Spinoza argues in Part 4 of the Ethics (4pp26d-28d) that the mind strives to understand and that understanding God is the mind's highest good. Yet 'good' is defined as "what is useful to … preserving our being" 18 Spinoza's most memorable endorsement of naturalism, in this sense, occurs in the beginning of the Preface to Part 3 of the Ethics, where he describes those whose approach he opposes: Most of those who have written about the Affects, and men's way of living, seem to treat, not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but of things which are outside of nature. Indeed, they seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion. For they believe that man disturbs, rather than follows, the order of nature …. 19 Spinoza's incrementalism is evident in, among other things, the prevalence of the locution 'insofar as' [quatenus] in his writing.
The Four Puzzles Resolved
The Scope of the Imagination. The first puzzle was this: How can Spinoza seriously maintain that the phenomenon of imagination is so pervasive as to include perception, by every individual thing, of "whatever happens in" its body? There can be no question that Spinoza does commit himself to this doctrine in 2pp12-17s. It is a consequence of his monism and his conception of God as infinitely thinking, which together lead him to identify God's ideas of things with the minds of those things. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the doctrine is in any way an unwanted or unintended consequence for Spinoza, for it constitutes a key element in his program of incremental naturalism.
Of course, if the doctrine is to have plausibility as well as programmatic value, Spinoza must be able to explain why it is not simply belied by the facts of everyday experience.
However, he has three resources available for doing so: the distinction among different senses of 'in', the distinction among degrees of imaginative confusion, and the distinction among degrees of power of thinking. The first of these allows him to limit the scope of 'everything that happens in'. The second and third allow him to minimize the force of 'perceives'.
In claiming that each thing perceives everything that happens in it, Spinoza is not committed to the view that each thing perceives everything that occurs within its outer spatial boundaries. To take an obvious example, one need not perceive what occurs in an object that has been swallowed or implanted under one's skin, if what occurs in that object has not been incorporated into the functioning of the structure of parts communicating motion in a distinctive manner that constitutes one's own body. Spinoza's argument in 2p12d that the mind perceives everything that happens in the body concerns the 'in' of inherence, not the 'in' of spatial containment. This is confirmed by Spinoza's later applications of 2p12, all of which concern perception of affections of the body-i.e., qualities that inhere in a body, not things that are within the boundaries by a body. A thing must perceive any change of its affections, Of course, as previously noted, Spinoza also holds that, just as an individual body is composed of bodies that are its parts, the mind of that body is composed of the ideas of those parts (2p15). Hence, ideas of bodily parts are "in" the mind in the non-inherence sense that they are parts of the whole; and thus any change to an idea of a part of a human body is also a change to an idea that is a part of the human mind. Nevertheless, Spinoza asserts in 2p24 that the parts composing the human Body pertain to the essence of the Body only insofar as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed manner … and not insofar as they can be considered as Individuals, without relation to the human Body. For the parts of the human Body are highly complex Individuals, whose parts can be separated from the human body and communicate their motions to other bodies in another manner, while the human Body completely preserves its nature and form.
Thus, Spinoza need not maintain that every change involving a part of the body-or even a complete replacement of one part by another-would make any difference to the qualitative character of a mind's perceptions, so long as the parts themselves were playing the same role, in the same way, in the functioning of that body. A watch may, considered as a watch, undergo little or no qualitative change as the result of incidental changes to or complete replacement of one of its parts. In a similar way, although one's mind includes as a part some idea of one's pancreas, and the ideas of each part of the pancreas make some contribution, as parts, to the idea of the pancreas that is a part of one's mind, the qualitative character of the ideas of one's mind may change very little or perhaps not at all in response to some changes-or even replacements-that occur to parts of the pancreas. A change to a part of a body is something that happens "in" the body, in the sense relevant to Spinoza's claim in 2p12, only to the extent that it also constitutes a change in affections of the body itself.
Second, a mind's perception of what happens in its body may be very highly confused.
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To the extent that a given state or affection of the body is something that any number of very different causes would have the power to produce, the mind will perceive the cause of that affection only very confusedly, without an ability to distinguish among these alternative causes. Consider, for example, the change in internal state that occurs when an apple is dropped and becomes slightly bruised. This state is, according to Spinoza, due partly to the nature of the apple, as an individual self-preserving mechanism; partly to the nature of its parts; and partly to the external causes that operated on it. But there are many combinations of internal and external causes that could produce this same state or affection; merely from the bruise, one could discern very little about its causes, either internal or external. Thus, the idea consisting in the perception of this state in the "mind" of the apple will be extremely confused-as contrasted with, for example, the complex and intricately structured state produced in the visual cortex of a mammal by exposure to a greengrocer dropping an apple in plain daylight. Yet, compared to most of the slow internal changes in an apple, the apple's perception of its bruise, poor as it is, must no doubt constitute one of its least confused (i.e., Spinoza is not trying to replace a relation of genuine representation with the simpler relation of "being an effect of." Rather, he is maintaining that a given internal state of a thing represents its external cause insofar as its production by that cause is able to play a role in determining the self-preserving behavior of a self-preserving individual. The pervasiveness of representation then follows from three further claims: (i) that every finite individual must tend, to some extent, to preserve itself; (ii) that even at the level of very rudimentary individuals, every affection of an individual has the capacity to play some role in determining the individual's self-preserving behavior; and (iii) that every affection of an individual involves to some extent the nature of the external causes of that state. At higher levels of "perfection," some affections of some individuals-such as human beings-owe a great deal of their very specific natures to very specific features of their external causes in a way that allows them to represent their causes quite distinctly; and some of these affections have a great deal of power to determine the sophisticated and highly discriminating self-preservatory behavior of the individuals in ways that are very sensitive to specific features of their causes.
Since plants and animals occupy various points on the scale between rudimentary individuals a certain level of complexity. Rather, it is a development and articulation of a phenomenon that is already present even in the least complex of individuals, all of which are selfpreserving mechanisms to at least some extent. How distinctly or confusedly representation will occur depends, of course, on how specifically or narrowly an idea serves to distinguish its real cause from other things. 21 How powerfully representation will occur depends on the power of the idea in determining self-preserving activity.
Consciousness. The third puzzle was this: How can Spinoza regard some instances of imagination as more conscious than others? Given the scope of the Spinozistic imagination, his willingness to infer propositions of the form "M is conscious of O" from propositions of the form "M has an idea of O" certainly commits him to the view that all finite individuals are conscious to at least some degree. Once again, however, this is not an embarrassment to Spinoza. Rather, it is a result that is entirely in accordance with his incremental naturalism: he intends to place human consciousness high on a scale that has its beginnings at the most rudimentary level of nature. Furthermore, he can do so, in his system, simply by identifying degrees of consciousness with degrees of power of thinking. This identification is almost irresistibly implied by the conjunction of 2p13s with 5p39s, both of which have been cited previously. In the former passage, he claims that a mind's degree of "reality" or perfectionwhich is its power of thinking-increases "in proportion as a Body is more capable than others of doing many things at once" and is "more capable of understanding distinctly."
Similarly, in the latter passage, he claims that an individual's mind is more conscious to the extent that it has "a Body capable of a great many things" and has an imagination that is "of little moment in relation to the intellect." Ethics 5p31 strengthens the identification of consciousness with perfection and power: "The more each of us is able to achieve in this perfect and blessed he is" (emphasis added).
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This identification of degrees of consciousness with degrees of power of thinking allows Spinoza to meet many of the explanatory demands on his theory of consciousness. First, it can explain why some minds enjoy a higher degree of consciousness than others, and why a given mind can increase or decrease in consciousness-for, as we have seen, power of thinking varies in just this way. 23 Second, it can explain why some ideas are more conscious than others in a given mind, and why the degree of consciousness of an idea in a given mind can increase or decrease; for, as we have seen, power of thinking varies in this way as well.
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Third, it can explain why both confused and distinct ideas can be conscious; for either kind of idea may play a powerful role in determining self-preservatory activity. Fourth, it can explain why relatively distinct ideas are more likely to have higher degrees of consciousness than relatively confused ideas; for the more distinct an idea is, the better fitted it is likely to be for guiding the sophisticated self-preservatory activity of individuals that have a high level of power of thinking. Fifth, it can explain why high degrees of consciousness should be correlated, as Spinoza says they are, with "having a body that is capable of many things at once"; for only individuals that have such bodies will have high degrees of conatus, which are expressed, under the attribute of thought, as high degrees of power of thinking. Finally, it can explain why higher degrees of consciousness are correlated with the development of the intellect; for although Spinoza's theory requires (as Wilson argues) that all individuals have the intellectual ideas that constitute the common notions, those individuals who succeed in having these ideas with greater power of thinking thereby achieve the highest kind of power for perseverance in being, because they maximize the parts of their minds that are eternal. in that sense bodily behavior might be said to "express" mental states such as imaginative perception. Once we understand Spinoza's theory of the universality of conatus, however, we see that all individuals engage in at least some self-preservatory bodily activity that is a result of their conatus or perfection, and hence in activity that expresses some power of thinking.
We fail to recognize the tendencies of rudimentary individuals to resist destruction and to persist in their distinct patterns of communicating motion as tendencies to self-preservatory activity only because the behavior is so minimal and undiscriminating. If Spinoza is right, however, it is nonetheless the rudimentary behavior of which more recognizably intentional activity is a sophisticated development.
Conclusion. I conclude that Spinoza has surprisingly rich resources for answering
Wilson's original question: namely, the question of whether he can identify the mind of a thing with God's idea of that thing while still "recognizing and taking account of" the occurrence of such "specific phenomena of human mentality" as ignorance of many bodily states, representation of the external world, consciousness, and expression in behavior. The identification itself results, in part, from his joint commitment to substance monism and a requirement that God be infinitely thinking. While some of his readers may well share his commitment to one or the other of these two doctrines, perhaps very few will share his -25-commitment to both. If the interpretation I have offered is correct, however, Spinoza was encouraged by his identification of minds with God's ideas to develop the outlines of a striking incremental naturalism concerning perception, representation, consciousness, and intentional behavior that may prove of considerable independent interest to philosophical naturalists as they seek to understand the human mind and imagination.
